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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/594,635	09/28/2006	Yoshiharu Ohta	2691-000050/US	4867
	7590 01/20/201 CKEY & PIERCE, P.L	EXAMINER		
P.O. BOX 8910	·	ABU ALI, SHUANGYI		
RESTON, VA	20195		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			1793	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			01/20/2010	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
10/594,635	OHTA ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	

	SHUANGYI ABU ALI	1793					
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence add	ress				
THE REPLY FILED <u>29 December 2009</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS	S APPLICATION IN CONDITION F	OR ALLOWANCE.					
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appel for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods:	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit eal (with appeal fee) in compliance v	i, or other evidence, www. with 37 CFR 41.31; or	hich places the (3) a Request				
a) The period for reply expires 4 months from the mailing date	of the final rejection.						
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire to Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07)	dvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the date set forth in the mailing (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE (f).	date of the final rejection FIRST REPLY WAS FII	n. LED WITHIN TWO				
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).							
NOTICE OF APPEAL  2. ☐ The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extern Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed w	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the					
<u>AMENDMENTS</u>	·	( )					
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, to the proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, to the proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, to the proposed amendment (see NoTE belogia). They are not deemed to place the application in bether appeal; and/or	nsideration and/or search (see NOT w);	E below);					
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).	corresponding number of finally reje	cted claims.					
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121. See attached Notice of Non-Compliant Amendment (PTOL-324).							
<ul> <li>5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):</li> <li>6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).</li> </ul>							
7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided the status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected:		be entered and an ex	xplanation of				
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:  AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE							
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, bu because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).</li> </ol>							
D. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will <u>not</u> be entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appeal and/or appellant fails to provide a showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1).							
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation of the status of the claims after entry is below or attached. REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER							
<ol> <li>The request for reconsideration has been considered bu <u>See Continuation Sheet.</u></li> </ol>	t does NOT place the application in	condition for allowan	ce because:				
<ul> <li>12. ☐ Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i>(s).</li> <li>13. ☐ Other: See Continuation Sheet.</li> </ul>	(PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)						
/J.A. LORENGO/ Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 1793	/Shuangyi Abu-Ali/ Examiner, Art Unit 1793						
Sept. Hoory I decide Examinor, the Office 1700	Examiner, Art Unit 1/93						

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: The applicant argues that the process of the instant application is different from the prior art. The Examiner respectfully submits that the instant claims are drawn to a composition. Eventhough product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 77F.2d 695, 698,227 USPQ 964,966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). The applicants fail to provide any factual evidence to show the contrary. The attorney's argument can not take place of the evidence. The applicant argues that there is no preferred examples to show the increased rate of the silica diameter as applicant set forth in the instant application. The Examiner respectfully submits that a reference is good not only for what it teaches but also for what one of ordinary skill might reasonably infer from the teachings. In re Opprecht 12 USPQ 2d 1235, 1236 (CAFC 1989); In re Bode USPQ 12; In re Lamberti 192 USPQ 278; In re Bozek 163 USPQ 54. The applicant argues that the prior art disclose the slurry having the rate of less than 50%. The Examiner respectfully submits that the reference differs from Applicant's recitations of claims by not disclosing identical ranges (less than 10%), However, the reference discloses "overlapping" ranges, and overlapping ranges have been held to establish prima facie obviousness (MPEP 2144.05). The applicant argues that Iwasa fail to disclose the increased rate of the silica diameter. The Examiner respectfully submits the rejection is made under 35 U.S. C. 103. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In this case the primary art teaching the increased rate of the silica particle diameter. Iwasa is used to show that fumed silica is preferred to be used in silica polishing slurry. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971). In this case, JP'268 and Iwasa are drawn to silica slurry for polishing and Iwasa disclose that fumed silica with a average diameter of 10-150 has good polishing quality (col. 5, lines 9-20). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use in fumed silica in JP'268's slurry to obtain good polishing quality. Furthermore, the applicants fail to provide any factual evidence to show the contrary. Attorney's argument can not take place of the evidence.